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The Effect of Selection Processes on Judicial Behavior
E. GRANT BALDWIN Brigham Young University
oes the judicial selection process affect judicial behavior? In this paper I argue that
the judicial selection process does affect the behavior and character of the judiciary.
Specifically, I argue that judges that are selected by executives in systems where
no accountability to the people is present will mirror the ideological views of the executive
in making their judicial decisions. I also argue that the competitive nature of elections
influences judges to be more responsive to public opinion than those held accountable on
non-competitive retention ballots. Lastly, I argue that judges that are elected or retained on
non-partisan ballots will be harsher in their decision making, especially in criminal cases,
than those on partisan ballots.

D

Word Count: 2076

INTRODUCTION

I

n the selection of judges, a common debate
emerges between those in favor of selecting
judges which have the greatest expertise and
those in favor of selecting judges that will be most
accountable to the people. Differing states and jurisdictions throughout the country have instituted
different methods whereby judges are selected
in hopes that those with certain desired characteristics or behaviors will serve. The emergence
of these different selection processes begs the
question, does the judicial selection process affect
judicial behavior?
In this paper I argue that the judicial selection
process does affect the behavior and character of
the judiciary. Specifically, I argue that judges
that are selected by executives in systems where
no accountability to the people is present will
mirror the ideological views of the executive in
making their judicial decisions. I also argue
that the competitive nature of elections influences
judges to be more responsive to public opinion
than those held accountable on non-competitive
retention ballots. Lastly, I argue that judges that
Grant Baldwin is an undergraduate student, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University,
84602 UT. (gbpolisci@gmail.com)
This is a manuscript submitted for my Principles
of American Politics course.

are elected or retained on non-partisan ballots will
be harsher in their decision making, especially in
criminal cases, than those on partisan ballots.

EXECUTIVE SELECTION
Judges that are selected by executives in systems
where no accountability to the people is required
will make decisions that mirror the ideological
views of the executive that selected them. Selection processes of this type are most commonly
seen at the federal level, where judges are appointed by the president and serve life-long terms
without the threat of losing office due to an unfavorable reelection. Although past presidents’
rhetoric may suggest that ideology is not their
most important factor when considering which
judges to appoint, the presidents have been highly
incentivized to appoint judges with similar ideologies to their own to ensure that policies they favor
will survive the court system for years to come
(Stidham et al. 1996). Because these judicial
positions are held for life without any accountability checks, the judges will experience little
to no incentive to adhere to public opinion when
making decisions. The decisions made by these
judges will spring from their personal ideologies,
and executives will appoint judges with similar
ideologies to their own.
When examining previous federal court decisions, district court judges appointed by liberal
1

RETENTION ELECTIONS
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Research suggests that incumbent judges are more
responsive to public demands when the potential
for electoral competition is higher (Gordon and
Huber 2007). The state of Kansas hosts districts
that retain judges based on non-competitive retention elections as well as districts that elect judges
on competitive ballots. Gordon and Huber (2007)
were interested to discover whether the behavior
among Kansas’ judges differed between the two selection types. They noted that the judges that faced
reelection in a competitive environment were motivated differently than judges in non-competitive
retention reelections. The introduction to a viable
challenger in an election alters the relationship
between the officials and the voters. Because a
potential challenger may bring an incumbent’s
malfeasance to the attention of the public, incumbents in competitive election systems are much
less likely to act irresponsibly (Gordon and Huber 2007). Incumbents will act with much more
regard to the opinion of the public knowing that a
potential competitor will challenge their actions at
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COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS
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Ideally, judges that are held accountable by retention reelections will exhibit behavior that shows
a balance between their own expertise as well as
alignment to public opinion. Many states throughout the country have adopted a judicial selection
process called the Missouri Plan. Under the Missouri Plan, judges are appointed by the state’s
executive based on merit and remain in office
after their term is completed by decision of the
voters in a non-partisan, non-competitive retention election (Aspin and Hall 1994). In theory,
the Missouri Plan ensures that the most qualified
judges will be appointed and will remain in office
if their decisions are supported by public opinion.
86.5 percent of surveyed judges under the Missouri Plan favor being held accountable through
these retention elections (Aspin and Hall 1994).
Most judges believe that the public is ignorant
about the quality of their work, but retention elections serve as a validation for their success (Baum
2009).
In practice, however, retention elections do
not tie judges’ decisions to the public opinion as
heavily as desired. Opponents of the Missouri
Plan argue that the public is not knowledgeable
enough to make informed voting decisions based

on judicial behavior in non-competitive and nonpartisan elections, so the outcomes of the elections show no reflection of public approval of the
judges’ decisions (Aspin and Hall 1994). The
only time that public opinion is put into account
by judges making decisions are in decisions made
closer to election day and those made in highly
visible criminal cases (Baum 2009). Resources
put into retention reelection campaigns are often
wasted due to reelection being extremely common.
State Supreme Court justices whose selection is retained by retention elections only have a 2% defeat
rate (Hall 2001). The commonality of reelection
reassures judges that their judicial behavior will
hardly ever cost them reelection. Judges will not
cater to public opinion in exhibiting most of their
judicial behavior under the Missouri Plan because
the public is often so uninformed that their opinion will not matter in terms of being retained for
another term. Public opinion will only be taken
into account on salient campaign issues closer to
reelection day.
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presidents make more liberal decisions when compared to the decisions made by judges appointed
by conservative presidents (Stidham et al. 1996).
From 1992-1996, decisions made by judges appointed by Jimmy Carter were the most liberal,
by Ronald Reagan the most conservative, and
by Bush and Clinton were comparatively moderate (Stidham et al. 1996). This data shows a
heavy correlation between the decisions made by
the judges and the ideology of the executive that
selected them. “It is clear that the president’s
party makes a difference in the way decisions are
made by the court” (Stidham et al. 1996). The
process whereby these judges are selected allows
the president to appoint those who will mirror
his ideology, and because no accountability is required, the judges’ decisions will be based almost
purely on ideology.
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the end of their term. State supreme court judges
facing partisan elections have a 19% defeat rate,
making them much more likely to lose their office
when their term is up compared to those facing
retention reelection (Hall 2001). The competitive
nature of these elections forces judges to act in
accordance with public will – more so than judges
facing non-competitive retention elections – so
that they can ensure their reelection for another
term.
Additionally, competitive election systems
will encourage lawyers who feel an attachment
to the public good to run for judicial office. The
election system will attract lawyers who are interested in what the public thinks of them and
deter those with no such interest from running
(Baum 2009). Because judges in these systems
are selected by the people, and not by an executive, aspiring judges will need to be involved with
the community and in tune with public opinion
before seeking judicial office. In a comparison
between judges in the urban centers of Pittsburgh
– where competitive elections select judges – and
Minneapolis, the judges in Pittsburg were more
strongly aligned with the public than those in
Minneapolis, because their pre-judicial public
involvement was much higher (Levin 1977). If
lawyers that are strongly oriented to the public
are attracted to run for judicial offices, the judges
produced from competitive election systems will
also be strongly oriented to the public.
Many legal elites and organizations argue
against the close ties to the public that competitive elections provide. Surveyed judges under
the Missouri Plan declared the lift from partisan
politics to be the chief benefit of retention elections (Aspin and Hall 1994). On top of that, the
American Bar Association (ABA) declared, “we
need judges who will tell us what the law is and
how it applies in individual cases without regard
to what the results of the latest public opinion
polls are” (ABA 2003). These elites worry that
competitive elections sway the judicial actions to
be too far aligned to public opinion and threaten
the fundamental idea of an independent judiciary
(Canes-Wrone et al. 2014). However, behavior of
judges in these competitive systems often counter

the elites’ claims. Justices elected in partisan elections are often willing to vote across party lines
and “have no more incentive to refrain from acting
independently than appointed judges do” (Choi
et al. 2010). This empirical evidence concludes
that although judges selected in competitive elections will often act in alignment to public opinion,
they will not give up the fundamental principle of
judicial independence.
Judges that are elected on non-partisan ballots have more incentives to be harsher in their
decision making, especially in criminal cases,
than those on partisan ballots. If party labels
are present, the inkling for a voter to choose the
judge representing the party they identify with
will overpower any negative information about
that candidate received through the campaign process. Because on non-partisan ballots the voters
lack the shortcuts provided to them by a partisan label, they will rely on information given to
them from the campaigns when making their vote
choice (Canes-Wrone et al. 2014). Due to this
reasoning, “judges who face nonpartisan . . .
elections should be more likely to issue popular
decisions than judges who face partisan elections”
because they will have to work to overcome the
lack of shortcuts provided by party labels (CanesWrone et al. 2014). The popularity of giving harsh
punishments to proven guilty criminals among
the public incentivizes judges to make punitive
decisions when sentencing criminals.
Recent observational research works to support these theories by providing empirical evidence that shows judges in non-partisan systems
are harsher (Gordon and Huber 2007; CanesWrone et al. 2014). Canes-Wrone et al. (2014)
collected data over 12,000 capital punishment
decisions between 1980 and 2006 and compared
their outcomes to the selection process present
among the judges that made the decisions. They
concluded that, “judges face the greatest pressure to uphold capital sentences in systems with
non-partisan ballots”. This pressure came from
a widespread agreement in public opinion for
providing harsh punishments to criminals found
guilty. Fear that a potential competitor could create a negative campaign message suggesting that
3

the incumbent is “soft” on crime will motivate the
incumbent to make harsh decisions in criminal
cases. Additionally, Gordon and Huber (2007) noticed that judges make more punitive decisions as
the threat of losing an election grows larger. The
incentives placed on a judge to ensure reelection
are large enough to also incentivize him or her to
provide harsher sentences, especially on salient
issues or high-profile criminal cases.

CONCLUSION
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The conclusions drawn in this paper can serve
as a guide for policymakers when considering
which selection process they wish to implement.
The judicial selection process does in fact have
an effect on the behavior and character of the judiciary. Those judges chosen by executives with
no accountability checks will act independent of
public opinion and based on ideology. The ideologies of these judges and their decisions are highly
correlated with the ideology of the executive that
appoints them. Additionally, judges that are selected and retained on systems determined by
competitive elections will act with a closer alignment to public opinion than those selected and
retained without competitive elections. The competitive nature of elections will also incentivize
judges to administer more punitive sentences,
especially in high-profile criminal cases and in
situations where the threat of losing reelection is
high. Policy makers can use these observed trends
when creating institutions or revising selection
processes to ensure that their desired outcome of
judicial behavior and character will be present in
their jurisdictions.
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